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THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
CONTAINING TRADE SECRETS
Trade secrecy1 is the most common form of legal protection for com-
puter software.2 Despite its popularity, state trade secret protection may
be costly or burdensome to maintain.3 A prudent trade secret holder
therefore may seek other forms of legal protection.4
Federal copyright law provides an additional source of legal protec-
tion.5 First, copyright,6 which extends to tangible forms of an author's
1. See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
2. See Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 909 (1970);
Bieglow, Legal Protection of Software: A Matter of Monumental Insignificance?, [1978] 3 Computer
L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) § 4-1, art. 5, at 120.
"Computer software" is the information that runs the machinery ("hardware") of a computer.
Software consists of magnetic pulses arranged in specific patterns on tapes or disks, or in the main
memory of the computer. J. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 22 (1983). The three
forms of software are computer programs, data bases, and documentation. Bender, Computer
Software Licensing, in PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS 349 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Bender,
Software Licensing].
Congress defined a "computer program" as a "set of statements or instructions to be used directly
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see also
Data Cash Sys. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 1979) ("a set of precise
instructions that tells a computer how to solve a problem"); Bender, Software Licensing, supra, at
349 ("the intelligence communicated to the computer by the human in his attempt to get the
machine to do his bidding"). Programs may be written in three computer languages--"high level
language," "assembly language," and "machine language." For definitions of those terms, see infra
note 61.
"Data bases" are machine-readable lists of information, such as customer and employee lists,
which are entered into the computer. Bender, Software Licensing, supra, at 349. "Documentation"
includes flow-charts or print-outs which "explain the operation of other software or hardware." Id.
This Note uses "software" to refer to all three forms of software. The use of "program" only
refers to computer programs, not data bases or documentation.
For nontechnical descriptions of computer operations, see, eg., R. RAYSMAN & P. BROWN, COM-
PUTER LAW - DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING FORMS AND AGREEMENTS § 1.01-. 13 (1984); Note,
Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code 96 HAv. L. REv. 1723 (1983); Note, Copy-
right Protection for Computer Programs in Read Only Memory Chips, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 329
(1982).
3. See infra notes 15 & 25-29 and accompanying text.
4. Trade secrecy's disadvantages may encourage the software owner to seek alternative forms
of legal protection, such as patent protection under federal law. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (1982).
The availability of patent protection for computer software, which is currently in doubt, is beyond
the scope of this Note. For a thorough examination of the possibility of federal patent protection for
computer software, see Stout, Protection of Programming in the Aftermath of Diamond v. Diehr, 4
COMPUTER L.J. 207 (1983). This Note assumes that the software owner has material that qualifies
for trade secret protection and that he or she wishes to protect the trade secret.
5. See infra notes 30-65 and accompanying text.
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expression,7 complements trade secret law, which protects the author's
underlying ideas.' Second, copyright may provide supplemental protec-
tion in the event of accidental dissemination of the software into the pub-
lic domain and attendant loss of trade secret status. 9 Thus, trade secret
and copyright coverage together provide the software owner with greater
protection than he or she could obtain from either alone.1
This Note explores the feasibility and desirability of supplementing
trade secret protection of software with federal copyright protection.
Parts I and II examine the availability of trade secret and copyright pro-
tection for computer software. 1 Part III analyzes the effect of copyright
notice and registration on trade secrecy.' 2 Part IV discusses policy con-
cerns and preemption problems that may stand as obstacles to dual trade
secret/copyright protection.' 3 The Note concludes that a software owner
may obtain the dual protection of copyright and trade secrecy if he or she
takes proper precautions to secure the confidentiality of the trade secret.
I. TRADE SECRECY
A. Introduction
Trade secret protection derives exclusively from state law. 4 State
trade secret protection generally extends to ideas and concepts, regard-
less of their physical embodiment.1 5 Most states and all federal jurisdic-
tions follow the Restatement of Torts definition of a "trade secret" as
6. Federal copyright is governed by the 1976 Copyright Act. Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982); see infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
10. The software owner would not be protected against honest or independent discovery of his
or her work. See infra note 15.
11. See infra notes 14-95 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 96-140 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 141-59 and accompanying text.
14. State unfair competition laws usually protect trade secrets. A 1976 survey of state trade
secret statutes by a committee of the American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark, and
Copyright Law revealed that twelve states do not have any laws protecting trade secrets and that the
other 38 states have statutory provisions offering various degrees of legal protection to trade secrets.
A.B.A. SECrION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW, COMMITTEE REPORTS 212-14
(1976), reprinted in 12A R. MILGRIM, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS app. B (1983).
15. E.g, Technicon Medical Information Sys. v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc., 687 F.2d 1032,
1038 (7th Cir.) (trade secret law protects the contents or ideas in a work), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106
(1983); Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., 522 F. Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. 11. 1981)
(trade secrecy protects an author's ideas); M. Bryce & Assoc., Inc. v. Gladstone, 107 Wis. 2d 241,
[Vol. 63:131
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"any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is
used in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."16
Traditional elements of a trade secret include secrecy,17 novelty,18 and
competitive value in a trade or business.19 The Restatement definition
presents six factors to define the crucial element of "secrecy": (1) knowl-
edge of the information outside one's business, (2) knowledge of the in-
formation by employees and other persons inside one's business,
(3) security measures designed to guard the secrecy of the information,
(4) the value of the information to the owner and his competitors, (5) the
amount of money and effort invested in developing the information, and
(6) the accessibility of the information to others.2 °
258, 319 N.W.2d 907, 915 (Wis. Ct. App.) (trade secrecy protects contents of a work regardless of
form of expression), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982).
Trade secrecy does not, however, protect against honest or independent discovery of the secret.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). Trade secrecy thus does not protect the
trade secret holder against "reverse engineering," the process of "starting with the known product
and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development." Id.
16. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT];
see 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 14, § 2.01 n.2. The proposed Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides
the following definition of a "trade secret":
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1973), reprinted in 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 14, app. A.
17. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,475 (1974) (trade secret must be secret,
not a matter of public knowledge or general knowledge in the owner's business); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 16, § 757 comment b (subject of a trade secret must remain secret); see also infra notes 22-
24 and accompanying text.
18. A trade secret need not be "novel" in the patent law sense. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. at 476. Rather, trade secrecy requires novelty only in the sense that "that which
does not possess novelty is usually known" and therefore no longer secret. Id. Cf. Telex Corp. v.
International Business Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (a valuable combination of
nonnovel features satisfies the novelty requirement); Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290 (5th
Cir. 1970) ("relative novelty" all that is required for trade secret protection).
19. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 757 comment b; see 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 14,
§ 2.02[] (defensive "protective" use of a trade secret does not satisfy the requirement of continuous
use).
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 757 comment b.
The holder of a trade secret is entitled to various remedies under state law, including injunctive
relief and damages. See Brooks, Computer Programs and Data Bases: Acquisition of Rights by Ven-
dors from Independent Developers and Users from Custom Designers, in SOFTWARE PROTECTION
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B. Trade Secrecy and Computer Software
State trade secret protection clearly extends to computer software.2'
As a practical matter, however, the software owner may find that he or
she must expend large sums of money and conduct business in an encum-
bered manner to maintain the secrecy of his or her trade secret.22 Abso-
lute secrecy is not essential to the protection of a trade secret.23 The
owner of computer software containing trade secrets may market the
software as long as he or she takes reasonable steps to maintain its confi-
dentiality-typically by licensing the software subject to a contractual
duty not to disclose.24
AND MARKETING 244-48 (1983). A few states provides criminal penalties for the theft of trade
secrets. See 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 14, app. B.
21. Bender, Software Licensing, supra note 2, at 376; see, eg., Structural Dynamics Research
Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (trade secret
in software support for structural analysis programs); Digital Dev. Corp. v. International Memory
Sys., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (trade secret in disc memory); Com-Share, Inc. v.
Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (trade secrets in both hardware and
software); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (trade secrets in
magnetic memory cores).
22. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. The Commission on New Technological
Uses acknowledged the costs associated with trade secrecy as follows:
[Uisers must cover the sellers' expenses associated with maintaining a secure system
through increased prices. Their freedom to do business in an unencumbered way is re-
duced, since they may need to enter into elaborate non-disclosure contracts with employees
and third parties who have access to the secrets and to limit that access to a very small
number of people. Since secrets are by definition known to only a few people, there is
necessarily a reduced flow of information in the marketplace, which hinders the ability of
potential buyers to make comparisons and hence leads to higher prices.
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 17 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as CONTU REPORT].
23. "There are two common law doctrines on seqrecy: (1) absolute secrecy and (2) relative
secrecy." K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1974); see also E.W. Bliss. Co. v.
Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 390, 400 (S.D. Iowa 1968) (recognizing "qualified secrecy"),
remanded on other grounds, 408 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1969); Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computers
Controls, Inc., 297 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1972) ("absolute secrecy is not essential").
24. 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 14 § 3.01. For a comprehensive list of contractual restrictions
that a trade secret holder may impose on a user of the trade secret, see Gilburne & Johnson, Trade
Secret Protection of Software Generally and in the Mass Market, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 211, 225 (1982).
The most common form of contractual software protection is the restrictive license agreement,
which restricts the licensee's use of the software and prohibits disclosure to third parties. R. RAYS.
MAN & P. BROWN, supra note 2, § 6.01 [1].
Wrongful disclosure or use entitles the trade secret holder to relief. See Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974). The Restatement definition of a trade secret emphasizes
wrongful disclosure and use of the trade secret:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without privilege to do so, is liable to the
other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss1/7
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The trade secret holder loses all trade secret protection 25 if he or she
places the secret in the public domain through either inadequate internal
security26 or unrestricted distribution to the public.27 Thus, while pru-
dent distribution of the trade secret will not destroy its protection,28
courts probably will not extend trade secret protection to mass-distrib-
uted software intended for commercial markets.29
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in
disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the fact that it was a secret
and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the third persons's
disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or,
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that its disclosure
was made to him by mistake.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 757.
Absent an express agreement, courts may provide a trade secret holder with equitable protection if
he or she reveals the secret to another in confidence and under an implied obligation not to disclose
it, such as in the employer/employee relationship. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at
475; see Bender, Software Licensing, supra note 2, at 376. See generally 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note
14, § 4.01.
25. Gilburne & Johnson, supra note 24, at 224; see 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 14, § 2.05[l]-[2].
26. A software owner must employ reasonable precautions to guard the "internal secrecy" of
his or her trade secret. The prudent software owner should obtain nondisclosure, noncompetition,
and confidentiality agreements from employees and business associates. R. RAYSMAN & P. BROWN,
supra note 2, § 6.01[3]. Additional security measures include use of exit interviews, legends, pass-
words, and controlled access to the trade secret. See Brooks, supra note 20, at 239-40. For an
examination of trade secret protection in the employment relationship, see Note, Trade Secrets and
the Skilled Employee in the Computer Industry, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 823 (1983).
27. The software owner should place proprietary notices at the beginning or end of all com-
puter printouts to give notice of the author's claimed rights to all persons coming into contact with
the software. R. RAYSMAN & P. BROWN, supra note 2, § 6.01[3].
28. For example, in Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105 (Del.
Ch. 1975), a minicomputer manufacturer distributed its maintenance diagrams to over 6,000 cus-
tomers. The court rejected an infringing customer's claim that the manufacturer inadequately pro-
tected the secrecy of the diagrams' design logic. Instead, the court held that the manufacturer's
extensive use of security devices, including proprietary legends restricting use of the diagrams to
maintenance needs only, were sufficient to protect the trade secret. Id. at 110-11; see also Manage-
ment Science America, Inc. v. Cyborg Sys., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Calaghan) 921, 924-26 (N.D.
11. 1978) (trade secret protection not destroyed when software distributed to 600 licensees subject to
agreement not to resell or disclose).
29. The "mass consumer market" generally consists of owners of small or personal computers.
J. SOMA, supra note 2, at 74. Sales are typically conducted through mail orders and retail stores at
low prices. Id. A software owner could not practically obtain nondisclosure agreements from
thousands of customers. Gilburne & Johnson, supra note 24, at 227. Even if the software owner
could obtain confidentiality agreements from its customers, the distribution of thousands of copies of
the software may nevertheless lead a court to find the contents insufficiently "secret" to warrant
protection. Id. at 228.
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I. COPYRIGHT UNDER THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Introduction
Federal copyright law under the 1976 Copyright Law Revision Act 30
("Copyright Act") protects an author's original form of expression,31
rather than the underlying idea or process that is the subject of expres-
sion.32 Copyrightable subject matter under the Copyright Act must sat-
isfy two basic requirements: it must be an "original work[ ] of
authorship, '33 and it must be "fixed in any tangible medium of
expression."
34
A federal copyright owner holds exclusive rights to reproduce and dis-
tribute the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works, and to per-
form or display the work publicly. 35 Generally, the duration of a
30. Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)). The copyright clause of the United States Constitution empowers Con-
gress to enact legislation for the protection of an author's work: "The Congress shall have Power
... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8. Congress enacted the first copyright statute in 1790. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat.
124 (1790). Congress revised federal copyright law three times prior to the 1976 Act: Act of Febru-
ary 3, 1831, ch. 16,4 Stat. 436 (1831); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870); Act of March
4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). Sixteen years of debate preceded enactment of the 1976 Act.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
32. Id. § 102(b). Courts traditionally have refused to extend federal copyright protection to
ideas. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("[copyright] protection is given only to the
expression of the idea - not to the idea itself"); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1879) (copyright
protects the "description of the art," not the "art itself").
33. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). "[A]uthor. . .in its constitutional sense, has been construed to
mean an 'originator,' 'he to whom anything owes its origin.'" Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
561 (1973) (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)).
Section 102(a) lists seven general categories of copyrightable works:
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). The constitutional requirement of a "writing" must be embod-
ied in a tangible form of expression. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[c] (1983). A
"writing" has been "interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual
or aesthetic labor." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
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copyright is the life of the author plus fifty years.36 In the event of copy-
right infringement, the copyright owner may resort to a number of statu-
torily defined remedies, including injunctive relief,3 7 actual damages,"
assignment of the infringer's profits,3 9 statutory damages,4° costs and at-
torney's fees, 4 ' and impoundment or destruction of infringing articles.42
An infringer may receive criminal penalties. 3
A. Copyrightability of Computer Software
In 1964, the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress decided that
computer programs were eligible for copyright registration"4 as "books"
under the 1909 Copyright Act,45 though it questioned whether a com-
puter program was a "writing of an author., 4 6 In Data Cash Systems v.
JS&A Group, Inc.,'7 a district court rejected this decision and held that a
computer program written in object code48 did not qualify for copyright
36. Id. § 302(a). The copyright duration of a "work for hire," as well as an anonymous or
pseudonymous work, is 75 years from the date of publication or 100 years from the date of creation,
whichever is less. Id. § 302(c). The copyright duration of a work prepared by two or more authors
who did not work for hire is the life of the last surviving author, plus an additional 50 years. Id.
§ 302(b).
37. Id. § 502.
38. Id. § 504(a)-(b). For computations of actual damages, see Szekely v. Eagle Lion Films,
Inc., 242 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957); Universal Pictures v. Harold Lloyd
Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)-(b) (1982).
40. Id. § 504(c). The amount of statutory damages is between $250 and $10,000, as the court
sees fit to award. Id. § 504(c)(1). In the event of willful infringement, the court may raise the
maximum to $50,000. Id. § 504(c)(2). "[S]tatutory damages may often constitute the only meaning-
ful remedy available to a copyright owner for infringement of his work .. " 2 M. NIMMER, supra
note 34, § 7.16[c]. Copyright registration is a condition precedent to recovery of statutory damages.
See infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text (discussing copyright registration).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1982). Registration is a condition precedent to recovery of attorney's fees.
See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1982).
43. Id. § 506(a). In the event of willful infringement, section 506(a) imposes a fine, imprison-
ment, or both. Id.
44. See infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text (discussing copyright registration).
45. Copyright Registration for Computer Programs-Announcement from the Copyright Office,
11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 361 (1964).
Because computers only date back to 1954 with the development of the Electronic Numerical
Integrator and Computer (ENIAC), the Copyright Act of 1909 did not contain any special provi-
sions for the copyright of computer software.
46. Id. The Copyright Office also questioned whether a machine-readable copy of a computer
program is the proper subject of copyright protection. Id.
47. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
48. See infra note 61 (describing object code).
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protection under the 1909 Act.49
The 1976 Copyright Act, as originally enacted, did not specifically
provide for copyright protection of computer software.50 The legislative
history of the Copyright Act, however, suggests that Congress consid-
ered computer programs copyrightable as "literary works."51 In Tandy
Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.52 the court examined the legisla-
tive history and concluded that the 1976 Copyright Act extended federal
copyright protection to computer programs.5 3 The court decided that a
computer program clearly satisfies the statutory requirements of "au-
thorship"54 and "fixation." 55
The Computer Software Copyright Act of 198056 dispelled any doubts
49. 480 F. Supp. at 1068-69. The court analogized the copyrightability of computer programs
with the copyrightability of architectural plans and piano rolls. Id. at 1068. In particular, the court
relied on White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). In White-Smith
Music, the Supreme Court held that an unauthorized piano roll of a copyrighted musical composi-
tion did not infringe the plaintiff's "right to copy." Id. at 18; cf. Synercom Technology, Inc. v.
University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (computer program for solving
engineering problems not copyrightable).
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. I 1977). In 1974, Congress commissioned the National Com-
mission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU"), Act of December 31, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873, to recommend new provisions in the copyright laws that
would apply to computer technology. CONTU REPORT, supra note 22, at 1. Section 117 of the
1976 Copyright Act, as originally written, merely preserved the status quo while awaiting CONTU's
final report; it neither expanded nor contracted the proprietary rights of software owners. 17 U.S.C.
§ 117 (Supp. 11977); see also infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (discussing 1980 amendments
to the 1976 Copyright Act).
51. The statutory definition of "literary works" includes all "verbal or numerical symbols or
indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as. . .tapes, disks, or cards in which
they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The House Report acknowledged that the definition of
"literary works. . . includes computer data bases, and computer programs to the extent that they
incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the
ideas themselves." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House
REPORT], reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5667. Furthermore, the CONTU
Final Report concluded that "it was clearly the intent of Congress to include computer programs
within the scope of copyrightable subject matter" in the 1976 Copyright Act. CONTU REPORT,
supra note 22, at 16.
52. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
53. Id. at 173-75.
54. The court's examination of the Copyright Act's legislative history led it to conclude that a
computer program is a "work of authorship" subject to copyright protection. Id. at 173.
55. The court found that the placement of a program upon a silicon chip clearly satisfied the
"fixation" requirement. Id.
56. Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028. The House
Report to the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980 concluded that the Act "ha[d] the effect of
clearly applying the 1976 law to computer programs. . . ." H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 19 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6509.
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as to the copyrightability of computer programs. The Act added a defini-
tion of "computer program"57 and created a special exception for com-
puter programs to the normal proscriptions against copying of
copyrighted works.58 Subsequent court decisions have firmly established
the copyrightability of computer programs.59
A recent line of court decisions' has extended copyright protection to
computer programs written in "object code,"6 1 a binary language that is
unintelligible to the human eye. Commentators and copyright infringe-
ment defendants had contended that a copyrightable work "must be in-
telligible to human beings and must be intended as a medium of
communication to human beings." 62 The United States Court of Ap-
57. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see supra note 2 (quoting definition).
58. Revised section 117 provides that "it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a
computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer
program" when necessary to "the utilization of the computer program" or "for archival purposes
only." 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). "The language of [section 117], by carving out an exception to the
normal proscriptions against copying, clearly indicates that programs are copyrightable and are
otherwise afforded copyright protection." Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); see 1 M. NIMMER, supra note
34, § 2.04[c].
59. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870,
875 (3d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
60. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed. 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v.
Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F.
Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
61. "Object code" is the lowest of three levels of computer languages. See Note, Copyright
Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1723, 1724-26 (1983). Object code
consists of extremely long sequences of "0" and "1" symbols called "bits" which represent the pres-
ence or absence of an electrical charge. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750 (N.D.
Il1. 1983). A computer program written in object code is called "machine language" because it is the
only form of programming language that a digital computer comprehends. Id.; Note, supra, at 1724.
For example, the binary figure "01101001" orders the Apple computer to add two numbers and save
the result. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
A computer programmer usually writes a program in a "high-level" language such as FOR-
TRAN, COBOL, or BASIC that utilizes English-like words and symbols. Note, supra, at 1725.
"GO TO 40," for example, tells a computer to proceed immediately to the instruction on line 40.
714 F.2d at 1243. A "compiler" translates high-level language into "assembly language," which is a
series of alpha-numeric labels such as "ADC" that instructs the Apple computer to "add with
carry." Id. A computer program written in high-level or assembly language is called source code.
Id. An "assembler" translates source code into object code. J. SOMA, supra note 2, at 23.
62. Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876-77 (3d Cir. 1982). This argu-
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peals for the Third Circuit dismissed this "communicative function" re-
quirement in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. The
Third Circuit examined the language of the Copyright Act and its legisla-
tive history and concluded that a computer program expressed in either
object code or source code is a "literary work"" under the 1976 Copy-
right Act.65
C. Mechanics of Obtaining Copyright Protection
Adherence to formalities such as notice of copyright, 66 registration, 67
and deposit 68 is a prerequisite to protection under the Copyright Act.
Failure to observe statutory formalities may result in the loss of the copy-
right or forfeiture of particular remedies.6 9 Unfortunately, strict obser-
vation of all formalities may endanger trade secret protection. The
owner of computer software containing trade secrets has three options in
procuring copyright under federal law.
1. Do nothing
Satisfaction of the "authorship" and "fixation" requirements of section
102 automatically secures copyright protection. 70  A computer software
owner need not satisfy any additional formalities unless he or she desires
ment stems from White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). In White-
Smith, the Supreme Court held that a piano roll was not copyrightable as a musical composition, as
it was not in a form that most persons could perceive.
63. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). The court noted that in
passing the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress clearly "intended to obliterate [the] distinctions engen-
dered by White-Smith." Id. at 1248.
64. Id. at 1249. The court examined section 101's definition of a "literary work" and concluded
that literary works under the Copyright Act are "not confined to literature in the nature of Heming-
way's 'For Whom the Bell Tolls.'" Id.
65. Id. at 1248-49. The court held that a computer program written in object code and embed-
ded in a "Read Only Memory" ("ROM") satisfied the statutory requirement of "fixation." Id, at
1249.
In general, a computer program written in object code must be stored or fixed in a memory device.
Id. at 1243. One such devise is a "floppy disk," a small flexible magnetic disk which may be inserted
into the computer's external circuitry. Note, supra note 61, at 1725. A "ROM," on the other hand,
is an integrated circuit that is permanently plugged into the interior of the computer. Id.
66. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
69. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.01.
70. "Copyright in a work . . . subsists from its creation .... " 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982).
Thus, the author of a private diary unknowingly procures federal copyright protection and is entitled
to the exclusive rights enumerated under § 106. See supra text accompanying note 35.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss1/7
Number 1] SOFTWARE COPYRIGHTABILITY
to "publish" the work. "Publication," as defined in section 101, is the
distribution or offer to distribute "copies or phonorecords of a work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending."'" With a few exceptions, failure to place a notice of copyright7"
on copies of a published work will inject the work into the public domain
with attendant loss of copyright protection.73
The owner of a copyrighted work without copyright notice may selec-
tively distribute the work without loss of copyright status. The common
law distinguished between "general publication" 74 and "limited publica-
tion." Only the former divested a work of copyright protection.75 A
limited publication "must be restricted both as to persons and pur-
pose.",76 The Copyright Act does not specifically refer to limited publica-
tion,77 but the statute defines "publication" as "distribution of copies
.. .of a work to the public."'78  Thus the distribution of a copyrighted
work without copyright notice will not place the work in the public do-
main if distribution is restricted to a small group of persons under an
obligation not to disclose or circulate.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
72. "Whenever a work protected under this title is published. . . by authority of the copyright
owner, a notice of copyright ...shall be placed on all publicly distributed copies. ... Id.
§ 401(a); see infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (describing copyright notice).
73. American Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 1981); 2 M. NIMMER,
supra note 34, § 7.14[A]; see King v. Burnett, 1983 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,489 (D.D.C.
1982) (copyright lost because notice was omitted from more than 300 of 1,335 copies sold).
Public distribution of a copyrighted work without notice will not automatically forfeit copyright
protection. See, e.g., Florists' Transworld Delivery v. Reliable Glassware and Pottery Co., 213
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 808, 811 (N.D. Ill. 1981). The copyright owner may retain copyright protection by
registering the work within five years of publication without notice and by making a reasonable effort
to add notice to all publicly distributed copies upon discovering the omission. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2)
(1982). Furthermore, a public distribution of a copyrighted work not containing copyright notice
does not destroy copyright protection if publication occurs without "the authority of the copyright
owner." 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.03; see supra note 70.
74. The statutory definition of "publication" in section 101 essentially codifies the common law
definition of "general publication." 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 34, § 4.04.
75. Id. § 4.13[A].
76. American Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting White v.
Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1952)). A limited publication "communicates the content
of a [work]. . .to a definitely selected group and for a limited purpose .... Id. See also 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 34, § 4.13[A] (the distribution of copies of an author's work to a few persons
under an understanding that the copies would not be duplicated or circulated would constitute a
"limited publication").
77. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 34, § 4.13[B].
78. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added). Professor Nimmer suggests that Congress in-
tended to maintain the doctrine of limited publication under the 1976 Copyright Act. 1 M. NIM-
MER, supra note 34, § 4.13[B].
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2 Affix notice of copyright to the software
Statutory notice of copyright contains three elements: the word "copy-
right" or a prescribed variation,79 the date of first publication,80 and the
name of the copyright owner.81 The software owner should place copy-
right notice near the title or end of the computer printouts or on a termi-
nal at sign-on, or should continuously display the notice on the terminal
or "permanent" container for the software.82 Publication with defective
notice of copyright may place the work in the public domain.83
3. Register the software
"Registration" with the Copyright Office is not a condition of copy-
right.84 Timely registration is, however, a prerequisite to filing an in-
fringement action85 and a condition to recovery of statutory damages and
attorney's fees. 6 Under the Copyright Act, a copyright owner may pre-
serve these rights by registering his or her work within three months
after publication.87 Failure to register within the three-month period
does not affect the copyright owner's right to other remedies.88
Copyright registration generally requires delivery of an application for
registration89 to the Copyright Office, accompanied by a fee9 and a "de-
79. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(1) (1982). The word "copyright," the abbreviation "copr.," or the sym-
bol @ will suffice. Id.
80. Id. § 401(b)(2).
81. Id. § 401(b)(3). No specific order is required under the Copyright Act; however, most
copyright owners choose to place the word "copyright," or its equivalent, first, the year of first
publication second, and the name of the owner last. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.05.
82. 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(g) (1984).
83. See, e.g., American Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 1981); see also
supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text (discussing publication without notice).
84. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.16[A].
85. 17 U.S.C. §411(a) (1982).
86. Id. § 412 (1982); see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. In addition, registration of
a work within five years of publication constitutes "prima facie evidence of the validity of the copy-
right." 17 U.S.C. § 410 (1982).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) (1982). The House Report to the Copyright Act justified this special
provision as "needed to take care of newsworthy or suddenly popular works which may be infringed
almost as soon as they are published, before the copyright owner has had a reasonable opportunity to
register his claim." HousE REPORT, supra note 51, at 158.
88. L. KNOBBE, ATTORNEY's GUIDE TO TRADE SECRETS § 7.4 (Supp. 1983); see supra notes
37-39 & 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing other statutory remedies).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1982). Section 409 governs the content of the application. 17 U.S.C.
§ 409 (1982). The registrant of a "literary work" such as computer software must file Copyright
Office Form TX. For a copy of Form TX and instructions, see A. LATMAN & R. GORMAN, COPY-
RIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIEs 300-01 (1982).
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posit"9 of copies of the registered work. Computer software is subject to
special deposit regulations. 92  For "machine-readable works,"93  the
Copyright Office requires only the deposit of "one copy of the identifying
portions" in lieu of complete copies.94 For computer software, the "iden-
tifying portions" consist of the "first and last twenty-five pages or
equivalent units" of the program or data base.95
III. THE EFFECT OF COPYRIGHT FORMALITIES ON TRADE SECRECY
A. Notice
Placement of a notice of copyright on computer software does not de-
stroy the owner's claim to trade secret protection of the contents.96 The
use of a copyright notice is just one factor relevant to a factual determi-
nation of whether the trade secret owner has taken reasonable security
measures to protect the trade secret.9 7
The distribution of software containing copyright notice to customers
arguably constitutes publication9" of the software's contents.99 Courts
have refused, however, to hold that copyright notice alone destroys trade
90. 17 U.S.C. § 480(a) (1982). The registration fee is $10.00. Id. § 708(a)(1).
91. Id. § 408(a). The owner of a published work must deposit two complete copies of the "best
edition" of the work with the Library of Congress. Id. § 408(b). The owner of an unpublished work
need deposit only one copy. Id.
92. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.19-.21 (1984). The Copyright Office derives its authority to issue spe-
cial deposit regulations from section 702, which permits the Register of Copyrights "to establish
regulations not inconsistent with law for the administration of the function and duties made the
responsibility of the Register under this title." 17 U.S.C. § 702 (1982); see also id. § 408(c) (author-
izing the Register to issue "optional deposit" regulations).
93. "Machine-readable works" are literary works which are fixed "only in the form of machine-
readable copies (such as magnetic tape or disks, punched cards, or the like) from which the work
cannot ordinarily be perceived except with the aid of a machine or device .. " 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.20(c)(2)(vii) (1984). Computer programs and data bases are "machine-readable works." Id.
94. Id. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.21 (1984) (describing procedure for depositing "identifying
material").
95. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii) (1984). These special regulations are pertinent to computer
programs and data bases, regardless of whether they are published or unpublished. Computer
software is exempt from the mandatory deposit requirements of section 407. 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.19(c)(5) (1984); see supra note 91 (describing mandatory deposit).
96. See Technicon Medical Information Sys. v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 343 (E.D. Wis. 1980), affid, 687 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1106
(1983); Management Science America, Inc. v. Cyborg Sys., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan)
921 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
97. See Gilburne & Johnson, supra note 24, at 231.
98. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (defining "publication").
99. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 1.0lIB] n.48.1.
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secrecy."° In Management Science America, Inc. v. Cyborg Systems,1"' a
software distributor accused a competitor of wrongfully appropriating
trade secrets. The defendant argued that the plaintiff published its
software and dedicated the contents to the public use by placing notice of
copyright on its manuals. 102 The court disagreed, holding that the "mere
act of affixing a copyright notice does not preclude the claim of se-
crecy."' 3 The court further held that placement of copyright notice on
the manuals did not constitute a waiver of the plaintiff's trade secret
rights in favor of federal copyright protection."°4
In Technicon Medical Information Systems v. Green Bay Packaging,
Inc.,10 5 the court rejected a more complex argument that notice
amounted to publication. The plaintiff provided computerized office
services and disseminated to its customers a reference manual that con-
tained copyright notice. The defendants observed that a copyright notice
contains the date of "first publication."' 6 They argued that the copy-
right notices in the manuals represented to plaintiff's customers that the
contents had been published in the year stated and therefore were no
longer secret.10 7 The district court, however, held that an author does
not, by placing copyright notice on his or her work, acknowledge to the
public that the work has been published.108 Rather, copyright notice
merely notifies the public that the owner has claimed a copyright in the
work commencing from the date in the notice.109
B. Registration
Copyright deposits are available for public inspection at the Library of
Congress for at least five years.110 Despite special regulations, "'I the de-
100. See, eg., American Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 1981).
101. 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 921 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
102. Id. at 923.
103. Id. at 924.
104. Id. at 924, 926. The defendant argued that the plaintiff, by affixing copyright notice to its
manuals, "elected" to pursue federal copyright protection and chose to waive its rights under state
trade secret law. The district court found that the defendant's "election" argument "merely begs the
issue" of whether the plaintiff adequately protected the confidentiality of his trade secrets. Id. at
926; see Brooks, supra note 20, at 228-29 ("election of remedies" argument unsound).
105. 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 343 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd, 687 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983).
106. Id. at 345; see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
107. 211 U.S.P.Q. at 345.
108. Id. at 347.
109. Id. at 346.
110. 17 U.S.C. § 705(b) (1982). Once received by the Copyright Office in connection with the
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posit of computer software as part of the registration process arguably
publishes the software and discloses its contents to the public.' 12  Com-
mon sense suggests that an item on public display cannot be secret; how-
ever, as a matter of law, the deposit of computer software does not
preclude trade secrecy.
1. Purpose of deposit
The text of the Copyright Act reveals that the purpose of copyright
deposit is not public disclosure of all copyrighted works."n Congress
authorized the Copyright Office to issue regulations permitting the de-
posit of "identifying material." '114 The Copyright Office accordingly is-
sued regulations exempting certain works from the deposit component of
registration.115  The registration of "secure tests"' 16 and other special
works discloses nothing to the public. The deposit of "identifying mate-
rial" reveals only that the owner has claimed copyright in the work.
Copyright deposit serves a largely archival function.' 17 The Copyright
Office uses the deposit to determine whether the copyright applicant has
registration process, deposits must be held "open to public inspection." Id. § 705(b). The Library of
Congress will retain most published deposits for five years. 48 Fed. Reg. 12,862 (1983). The Library
of Congress will retain all unpublished deposits for their term of copyright unless the copyright
owner submits a reproduction of the entire deposit. 17 U.S.C. § 704(d) (1982).
111. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
112. See Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., 522 F. Supp. 367, 369 (N.D. Ill.
1981) ("that [plaintiff] registered its User's Manual for a copyright might well affect the continued
secrecy of the ideas in that manual...").
113. See Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 38-39 (1939) (purpose of de-
posit under the 1909 Act is not to create a collection of copyrighted works for public inspection);
National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 692 F.2d 478, 486 (7th Cir.
1982) (the purpose of the deposit regulations is not public disclosure), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 69
(1983).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 408(c) (1982); see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
115. Many published works, including computer software, are exempt from the mandatory de-
posit requirements of section 407. 37 C.F.R § 202.19(c) (1984). In addition, the owner of certain
testing material, whether published or unpublished, does not have to place his or her copyright
deposit on public display with the Copyright Office. See id. § 202.20(c)(2)(vi).
116. A "secure test" is a "nonmarketed test administered under supervision at specified centers
on specific dates, all copies of which are accounted for and either destroyed or returned to restricted
locked storage following each administration." Id. § 202.20(b)(4). The Copyright Office will return
the deposit of a "secure test" to a copyright applicant promptly after submission and examination.
Id. § 202.20(c)(2)(vi); see supra note 115. The Seventh Circuit sustained the constitutionality of the
secure test regulations in National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc.,
692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982).
117. See 48 Fed. Reg. 22,953 (1983).
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submitted an original work of authorship.' 1 The general public relies on
the deposit collection in copyright infringement actions and business
transactions. "19
Thus, copyright deposit, like copyright notice, is just one factor in de-
termining whether the trade secret holder has adequately protected the
trade secret. 20 In Warrington Associates, Inc. v. Real-Time Engineering
Systems, 2 ' a designer and marketer of financial software registered its
user's manual with the Copyright Office. The district court observed
that the registration and deposit of the manual may have affected the
secrecy of the ideas contained therein.'22 The court refused, however, to
grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that "the
mere fact that an expression is copyrighted does not, in and of itself,
disclose the trade secret or eliminate its mantle of confidentiality."'123
Similarly, in GCA Corp. v. Chance, 24 a manufacturer of machines
used in processing silicon chips deposited the first and last twenty-five
pages of its source code with the Copyright Office as part of the registra-
tion process. 25 The court observed that the manufacturer signed confi-
dential information agreements with its employees and held that former
employees breached their contractual duty not to disclose the contents of
the manufacturer's software.126 The court accordingly granted the man-
ufacturer's motions for injunctive relief for copyright infringement and
trade secret misappropriation, notwithstanding the manufacturer's regis-
tration of the software. 27
2. Public access to deposits
As a practical matter, deposit of software with the Copyright Office
118. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 51, at 171 (value of deposits in "identifying copyrighted
works").
119. 48 Fed. Reg. 22,953 (1983). The House Report to the Copyright Act noted the "many
difficulties encountered when copies needed for identification in connection with litigation or other
purposes have been destroyed." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 51, at 171.
120. See supra text accompanying note 97.
121. 522 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
122. Id. at 369.
123. Id. at 368.
124. 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
125. Id. at 719.
126. Id. at 721.
127. Id. at 720-21. The defendants contended that the manufacturer failed to obtain copyright
protection for its object code. Id. at 719. The court rejected this argument, holding that "copyright
of the source code protects the object code as well." Id. at 720.
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may reveal nothing to persons who wish to examine the deposit. The
Copyright Office's indexing system makes deposits extremely difficult to
locate. 128 An examiner who does locate the desired deposit may find
only the first and last twenty-five pages of a computer program or data
base with all trade secrets carefully excised from the deposit.' 29 Further-
more, Copyright Office regulations forbid copying of a deposit unless the
examiner is the owner of the copyrighted work or a litigant.'x 0 Finally,
the Copyright Office does not furnish copies.'
3. Relief from deposit requirements
As an added measure of security, a copyright applicant may elect to
deposit only the object code version of his software with the Copyright
Office.' 32 The Copyright Office prefers the deposit of source code, as it
constitutes the "best representation of authorship."' 33 Under its "rule of
doubt," however, the Copyright Office will accept the deposit of object
code "for whatever it may be worth."' 34 If a letter from the author certi-
fying that the deposit represents an "original work of authorship" ac-
companies the deposit, the Copyright Office will issue a certificate of
registration.' This certificate, however, does not provide prima facie
128. Copyright Office deposits are indexed according to author, title, and number. 48 Fed. Reg.
22,953 (1983). The identifying features may not be very helpful. Authors are frequently unknown
contributors or employees, and the title of a deposit is often completely uninformative. Brooks,
supra note 20, at 214.
129. The intelligent software owner will carefully hide all trade secrets between the first and last
25 pages of a deposited computer program or data base. See R. RAYSMAN & P. BROWN, supra note
2, § 5.03[2].
130. 37 C.F.R. § 201.2(d)(4) (1984).
131. The Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)), specifically exempts trade secrets and confidential commercial
information from its disclosure provisions. 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4) (1982).
132. See supra note 61 (defining object code). Object code is illegible to all but a few experts.
Public inspection of a long string of "0" and "I" symbols should not disclose the software's unique
design or logic.
133. 48 Fed. Reg. 22,952 (1983).
134. Id. A registrant depositing object code receives a GLR-70 letter from the Copyright Office,
notifying him or her of acceptance of the deposit. R. RAYSMAN & P. BROWN, supra note 2,
§ 5.03[3].
135. See L. KNOBBE, supra note 88, § 7.3; Brooks, supra note 20, at 218-19. Commentators
have criticized the Copyright Office's "rule of doubt" as overly favorable to the deposit of object
code. See J. SOMA, supra note 2, at 48 n. 177. Many deposited materials, such as foreign language
books and source code, may also be difficult to examine yet are not subject to the rule. Id.
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evidence of the copyright's validity. 136 Thus, the copyright holder may
have difficulty obtaining a preliminary injunction or bringing an infringe-
ment action.
137
A software owner may, upon written request, seek "special relief"
from the deposit requirements.' 38  "Special relief," however, may consist
of nothing more than permission to deposit "identifying material" in lieu
of complete copies 139 - relief that the software owner already possesses.
In addition, the software owner may have difficulty demonstrating "spe-
cial" circumstances justifying such relief."4
IV. OTHER OBSTACLES TO DUAL PROTECTION
A. Policy Considerations
The coexistence of copyright and trade secrecy in a single work raises
the basic policy question whether the benefits of federal copyright protec-
tion should be extended to an author who is unwilling or unable to dis-
136. Brooks, supra note 20, at 219; see supra note 86 (registration generally constitutes prima
facie evidence of validity).
137. J. SOMA, supra note 2, at 48 n.177.
138. 37 C.F.R § 202.20(d) (1984).
139. Id.
140. The Copyright Office receives many requests for "special relief" from owners of works con-
taining trade secrets and other confidential material. 48 Fed. Reg. 22,952 (1983). The possibility of
"special relief" is greatest when the copyright applicant can "excise the confidential material and
deposit a substantial representation of the authorship in the work[ ]." Id.
Congress considered but rejected legislation that would have directed the Register of Copyrights
to "prescribe regulations for the secure deposit of material, including computer software, which is
maintained or distributed on a confidential or restricted basis." H.R. 6983, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982). The legislation also would have clarified the extent of federal preemption by amending sec-
tion 301 to read: "Nothing in this title shall alter or limit any right or remedy which the owner of a
copyright may have under state trade secret law that is not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106." Id. See infra notes 149-59 and
accompanying text (discussing the possibility of federal preemption of state trade secret law).
The Copyright Office is presently reviewing its deposit regulations and is considering the possibil-
ity of special deposit provisions for computer 'programs and other works that contain trade secrets.
48 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (1983). The Copyright Office proposes promulgating special deposit regulations
that are similar to regulations governing the deposit of secure tests. See supra note 116 and accom-
panying text (discussing secure test regulations). The Copyright Office intended the secure test regu-
lations to address the "special problems of confidentiality faced by creators and administrators of
secure tests." 48 Fed. Reg. at 22,952. The proprietor of computer software and other works con-
taining trade secrets faces similar problems of confidentiality in securing copyright protection under
the Copyright Act. Based on National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies,
Inc., 692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 69 (1983), which upheld the constitution-
ality of secure test regulations, the Copyright Office should have the authority to issue similar regula-
tions for the deposit of computer software and other works containing trade secrets.
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close his or her work to the public.141  Courts and commentators
frequently perceive the major purpose of copyright law as promoting dis-
closure of the author's work and view trade secrecy as inherently incon-
sistent with this goal. 142
Traditionally, copyright has served to encourage disclosure of intellec-
tual ideas to the public.' 4a Disclosure remains a vital, if not primary,
purpose of copyright law.'" Increasingly, however, courts are willing to
recognize the value of copyright protection as a "reward" for the au-
thor's labors.' 45 The Supreme Court recently characterized federal copy-
right protection as a "balance" between the private interests of authors in
141. See 48 Fed. Reg. 22,954 (1983).
142. In 1981, the American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law
summarized the perceived conflict between copyright and trade secret law as follows:
The conflict in the dual use of state trade secret and federal copyright protection stems
from the inherent substantive differences between them. Copyright protection is the mani-
festation of the constitutional power to extend a limited commercial monopoly to creators
in order to promote the general public good through the diffusion of knowledge and the
concomitant stimulation of progress and competition in a free society. Copyright protec-
tion requires the creator to relinquish, however, all rights save for those reserved and enu-
merated by the Copyright Act, i.e., the control of copying and reproduction of the work.
Copyrighting a work therefore results in its divulgation to the public, including the ideas
inherently embodied therein, and the public may make "open and free" use of such mate-
ral within the strictures of the copyright law.
Conversely, secrecy and non-disclosure are the very essence of state trade secret protec-
tion. The creator has a right to perpetual protection of the secret as long as secrecy is
maintained, but the risks are substantial. Trade secret protection evaporates upon any
disclosure, whether intentional or inadvertent. Nor is any protection afforded against any
independent development of the same secret by another or "reverse engineering" of it. In
summary, a choice is offered-an exclusive federal right for a limited time versus an imper-
fect state law perpetual remedy.
A.B.A. SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW, COMMITTEE REPORTS 91-92
(1981) (emphasis added).
143. The traditional purpose of public disclosure follows from the copyright clause of the Consti-
tution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8 ("to promote the progress of science and useful arts"). In
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975), the Supreme Court declared that
although federal copyright protection serves the private interests of authors, copyright "must ulti-
mately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other
arts." Id. at 156; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (purpose of copyright is to
promote the public welfare); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (primary purpose of
copyright is to enhance public welfare through the labor of authors).
144. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. 774, 782 (1984) (federal copyright law
primarily serves "an important public purpose"); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 34, § 104[A].
145. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. 774, 782 (1984) (copyright law "moti-
vate[s] the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward"); see also
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1976) (copyright law recognizes
"important role of artists in society" and encourages "production and dissemination of artistic
works"); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 581 (D.D.C. 1981) (purpose
of copyright law is "to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation").
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exploiting their works and the competing interests of society in receiving
a "free flow" of ideas and information.146
The structure of the Copyright Act indicates that the public disclosure
of an author's ideas is not the price of copyright protection. The statute
places little emphasis on disclosure or publication; indeed, copyright pro-
tection "subsists" in a work from the moment of its creation. 147 A "lim-
ited publication" of a copyrighted work reveals little to the public.1 48
Thus, the software owner who markets his or her trade secrets to a care-
fully selected group of customers should not run afoul of the purpose of
copyright law.
B. Preemption
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution 49 prohibits
states from impeding the effectiveness of congressional legislation.1t 0
Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts state protection of rights that
are "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights" of copyright in "works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come
within the subject matter of copyright .. ... "I State trade secret law
protects many works that are eligible for federal copyright protection
and provides many remedies that are similar to the exclusive rights of
copyright.' 52 The overlap between copyright and trade secret rights has
provoked concern that the Copyright Act preempts state trade secret
146. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. 774, 782 (1984).
147. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982); see supra note 70 and accompanying text (copyright protection
automatically follows from satisfaction of "authorship" and "fixation" requirements).
148. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
149. The supremacy clause states "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby ...." U.S. CONSr. art. VI.
150. Federal law preempts state law whenever the latter "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974); Sears, Roebuck,
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176
(1942). States may regulate the field of intellectual property as long as they do not act inconsistently
with federal law. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974).
151. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
152. For example, if a licensee under a duty of confidentiality to a trade secret holder copies a
computer program containing trade secrets and subsequently sells the copy, the trade secret holder
may obtain injunctive relief under both the Copyright Act and most state trade secret laws. L.
KNOBBE, supra note 88, §§ 1.9A, 7.13.
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Causes of action under state trade secret laws alleging wrongful acts of
reproduction, distribution, performance, or display raise preemption
problems under section 301. In Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., 11
for example, a manufacturer of replacement parts for aircraft engines al-
leged that a competitor appropriated its trade secrets by improperly
copying drawings and specifications.155 The court concluded that section
301 preempted the plaintiff's state law cause of action for misappropria-
tion of trade secrets. The court held that the drawings and specifications
fell within the subject matter of copyright and that the reproduction of
an author's work is an exclusive right under federal copyright law.156
Section 301 should not preempt causes of action under state trade se-
cret laws in which the trade secret holder alleges the wrongful "use" or
"disclosure" of his or her trade secret. 157  State trade secret remedies,
which protect the content of a work, are not "equivalent" to federal
copyright remedies, which only protect the form of a work. 5 ' Recent
153. A series of Supreme Court decisions involving the conflict between state and federal law in
the field of intellectual property hint that federal copyright law may preempt state trade secrets law.
See Sears, Roebuck, & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (federal patent laws preempted Califor-
nia unfair competition law); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (federal
patent laws preempted California unfair competition law). But see Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil
Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (federal patent laws do not preempt state contract law); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (federal patent laws do not preempt Ohio trade secret laws);
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (federal copyright laws do not preempt California crimi-
nal statute). See generally Luccarelli, The Supremacy of Federal Copyright Law Over State Trade
Secret Law for Copyrightable Computer Program Marked with a Copyright Notice, 3 COMPUTER L.L
19 (1981).
154. 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 894 (M.D. Ala. 1980), affd on other grounds, 676 F.2d 494 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982).
155. Id. at 895-96.
156. Id. at 897; see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195,
199-201 (2d Cir. 1983) (causes of action for conversion and tortious interference with contractual
rights held preempted when defendants wrongfully obtained an unpublished manuscript and copied
portions), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984); Mitchell v. Penton Indus. Publishing Co., 486 F.
Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (unfair competition cause of action held preempted when defendant
copied portions of plaintiff's book for defendant's article); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office,
474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (counterclaim under state unfair competition law for the misap-
propriation and public performance of broadcast signals held preempted).
157. See L. KNOBBE, supra note 88, at § 1.9A; Brooks, supra note 20, at 221-22; see also supra
note 24 (discussing state law proscriptions against the wrongful disclosure or use of trade secrets).
158. See M. Bryce & Assocs., Inc. v. Gladstone, 107 Wis. 2d 241, 258-59, 319 N.W.2d 907, 915-
16 (Wis. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982). The Supreme Court noted the distinction
between copyright and trade secret protection as early as 1879: "The copyright of a work on mathe-
matical science cannot give to the author an exclusive right to the methods of operation which he
propounds, or to the diagrams which he employs to explain them .. " Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
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decisions concerning software have thoroughly examined the preemption
issue and have concluded that section 301 does not preempt trade secrecy
under state law. 159
CONCLUSION
The proprietor of computer software containing trade secrets should
secure federal copyright protection. The precise method of procuring
copyright depends on the particularities of each case. The formalities
associated with securing copyright protection under the Copyright
Act160 may bear on the critical issue of whether the proprietor has ade-
quately protected the confidentiality of his or her trade secret. 161 How-
ever, the act of obtaining copyright protection does not, in itself, destroy
the copyright owner's right to proprietary protection under state trade
secret laws.
In general, the safest course of action available to the software owner is
to place a notice of copyright on the software and to refrain from regis-
tering the software with the Copyright Office. In the event of accidental
and unrestricted dissemination of the software to the public, the copy-
right owner may register the software within three months of publication
without forfeiting any of his or her statutory remedies. 162 The software
owner who decides to register his or her work should consider depositing
99, 103 (1879); see also Technicon Medical Information Sys. v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc., 687 F.2d
1032, 1038 (7th Cir. 1982), ("[tlhe Copyright Act is designed to protect the form of a work while
trade secret law applies to the contents or ideas in a work"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983);
Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., 522 F. Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("neither
Congress nor the courts have viewed the federal Copyright Act as preempting the common law of
trade secret misappropriation").
159. See Technicon Medical Information Sys. v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc., 687 F.2d 1032,
1038-39 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983); BPI Sys. v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208, 211
(W.D. Tex. 1981); Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., 522 F. Supp. 367, 368-69
(N.D. Ill. 1981); M. Bryce & Assocs., Inc. v. Gladstone, 107 Wis. 2d 241, 257-67, 319 N.W.2d 907,
915-19 (Wis. Ct. App.), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982). In Bryce, the Court of Appeals of Wiscon-
sin examined the legislative history of section 301, decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and
the distinction between copyright and trade secret protection and concluded that the Copyright Act
does not preempt state trade secret law:
Since no "unmistakable" indication has been given to the contrary by Congress and the
weight of the evidence points to the recognition by Congress and other authorities of the
value of state protection of trade secrets, we conclude that state trade secret protection has
not been preempted by the federal copyright laws.
Id. at 266-67, 319 N.W.2d at 919.
160. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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only object code with the Copyright Office. 1 6 3
The combination of copyright and trade secret protection does not
provide the software owner with comprehensive legal coverage. The
software is still susceptible to honest or accidental discovery. 164 More-
over, the software owner must continue to protect the security of his or
her trade secret at great effort and expense. The added measure of copy-
right provides the trade secret holder with relief in the event of accidental
injection of the trade secret into the public domain with attendant loss of
trade secret protection.
Robert H. Solomon
163. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 15.
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